Discussion:
[tor-talk] exit ports to open in relay *without* issue...
Udo van den Heuvel
2018-09-07 07:08:40 UTC
Permalink
Hello,

In the past I opened up some 'innocent' exit ports and after a while my
ISP detected a Windows virus of some sorts from my IP('s).
So I went to relay only and that problem was fixed.

Then I thought I was `smart` and opened just a few ports that (normally)
carry SSL-protected connections.
Same thing happened, the ISP detected some (other) virus activity after
a while.

As I do not run Windows at all, these virus detections must come via the
tor exit ports.

Is there a 'safe' choice in this that will not trigger virus activity?
Of course the normal SSL-protected traffic does not mean the virus will
do the same...
So what can I do besides run non-exit?

Udo
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Nathaniel Suchy
2018-09-07 13:10:49 UTC
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Port numbers might “limit” traffic when a service is using default ports.
However I could configure SSH to run on port 80 without an issue.

Similarly, no matter what the port is, a malware author can use it to send
malware out.

Talk to your ISP about what Tor is and ask them to disable the virus filter
on your account.

Cordially,
Nathaniel
Post by Udo van den Heuvel
Hello,
In the past I opened up some 'innocent' exit ports and after a while my
ISP detected a Windows virus of some sorts from my IP('s).
So I went to relay only and that problem was fixed.
Then I thought I was `smart` and opened just a few ports that (normally)
carry SSL-protected connections.
Same thing happened, the ISP detected some (other) virus activity after
a while.
As I do not run Windows at all, these virus detections must come via the
tor exit ports.
Is there a 'safe' choice in this that will not trigger virus activity?
Of course the normal SSL-protected traffic does not mean the virus will
do the same...
So what can I do besides run non-exit?
Udo
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Udo van den Heuvel
2018-09-07 13:14:34 UTC
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Post by Nathaniel Suchy
Talk to your ISP about what Tor is and ask them to disable the virus filter
on your account.
Thanks..
But local ISP is only one side.
The virus stuff goes somewhere and will also be detected elsewhere.
Then mail will be blacklisted (because a virus does not send mail!?), etc.

This will impact the usability of my internet connection.

How to avoid this *and* still allow some exit?

Udo
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Nathaniel Suchy
2018-09-07 13:17:28 UTC
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This is something you need to talk to your ISP about. Communicate with them
and see if they can work something out.

Cordially,
Nathaniel
Post by Nathaniel Suchy
Post by Nathaniel Suchy
Talk to your ISP about what Tor is and ask them to disable the virus
filter
Post by Nathaniel Suchy
on your account.
Thanks..
But local ISP is only one side.
The virus stuff goes somewhere and will also be detected elsewhere.
Then mail will be blacklisted (because a virus does not send mail!?), etc.
This will impact the usability of my internet connection.
How to avoid this *and* still allow some exit?
Udo
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Udo van den Heuvel
2018-09-07 15:40:44 UTC
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Post by Nathaniel Suchy
This is something you need to talk to your ISP about. Communicate with
them and see if they can work something out.
The ISP whitelisted my IP in their quarantine system to avoid this issue
next time.
This solves only the local part of the issue, though.

Udo
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nusenu
2018-09-07 16:50:00 UTC
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before tackling the actual question, a short description of how detection of malware activity is
usually performed in this context - at least in the context of these kinds of "abuse" emails:

* organizations like shadowservers [1] and others operate sinkhole servers that listen
for incoming connections on IPs or domains used by malware (i.e. former C&C server)
* everytime they get a connection to their sinkhole systems they write down where the connection came from (i.e. your exit IP address)
* then they automatically inform that IP holder (usually the AS abuse contact or a national CERT of the
country where the AS is located) of that registered event since it is a sign of a potential
infection of the source IP

This makes sense for most of the internet, unfortunately this methodology of source IP based attribution
causes "abuse" emails for Tor exits when infected clients (or security researchers or anyone) visits sinkhole IPs via
their Tor.


- you can not solve this based on a port level because ports 80 and 443 is frequently used
by malware for outbound connections and 80+443 is required for the exit flag

- there is a methodology to reduce the amount of such emails that does not get you the BadExit flag:
blacklisting sinkhole IPs in your exit policy, but these are not generally public.

There are lists of IP addresses of such sinkholes that exit operators could use in their exit policy but the problem is:
- they can not be comprehensive (sinkhole IPs try to remain secret)
- they can contain false positives
- they might contain old IPs
- there trustworthiness is unknown

In a little side project I'm aiming to evaluate the effectiveness of these sinkhole lists
by correlating them with such related "abuse" notifications to answer the questions:

Do these public sinkhole IP list match IPs from actual sinkhole IPs mentioned in abuse notifications?
How effective would using these IPs in a Tor exit relay's ExitPolicy be at reducing the amount of such notification emails?
How much overblocking would occur?
How static are these lists?

If you are an exit operator and want to help with that little project you can submit information covering
such cases in a specific CSV format to the email address bellow.

To prevent getting spammed the email must be send from the email address mentioned in the relay's ContactInfo field following this spec:
https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification#email
and you should not send more than one email per day per sender. (plus points for DKIM signed emails)

**Please do NOT submit data that is related to other types of abuse emails**

CSV format:

timestamp,destination IP address,destination port,feed-name

timestamp: YYYY-MM (please do not include more fine grained time information)
destination IP address: IPv4 or IPv6 address (mandatory)
destination port (if available)
feed-name (if available) example value: shadowserver-drone

email address:
sinkhole-malware-alerts riseup net



[1] https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Services/Botnet-Drone-Hadoop
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Nathaniel Suchy
2018-09-07 17:05:39 UTC
Permalink
One suggestion I’ll add is
https://tornull.org has a huge exit policy with common sinkholes and other
abusive networks. You won’t stop them all BUT it may reduce the complaints
your ISP gets.

Cordially,
Nathaniel
Post by nusenu
before tackling the actual question, a short description of how detection
of malware activity is
usually performed in this context - at least in the context of these kinds
* organizations like shadowservers [1] and others operate sinkhole servers that listen
for incoming connections on IPs or domains used by malware (i.e. former C&C server)
* everytime they get a connection to their sinkhole systems they write
down where the connection came from (i.e. your exit IP address)
* then they automatically inform that IP holder (usually the AS abuse
contact or a national CERT of the
country where the AS is located) of that registered event since it is a sign of a potential
infection of the source IP
This makes sense for most of the internet, unfortunately this methodology
of source IP based attribution
causes "abuse" emails for Tor exits when infected clients (or security
researchers or anyone) visits sinkhole IPs via
their Tor.
- you can not solve this based on a port level because ports 80 and 443 is frequently used
by malware for outbound connections and 80+443 is required for the exit flag
- there is a methodology to reduce the amount of such emails that does not
blacklisting sinkhole IPs in your exit policy, but these are not generally public.
There are lists of IP addresses of such sinkholes that exit operators
- they can not be comprehensive (sinkhole IPs try to remain secret)
- they can contain false positives
- they might contain old IPs
- there trustworthiness is unknown
In a little side project I'm aiming to evaluate the effectiveness of these sinkhole lists
Do these public sinkhole IP list match IPs from actual sinkhole IPs
mentioned in abuse notifications?
How effective would using these IPs in a Tor exit relay's ExitPolicy be at
reducing the amount of such notification emails?
How much overblocking would occur?
How static are these lists?
If you are an exit operator and want to help with that little project you
can submit information covering
such cases in a specific CSV format to the email address bellow.
To prevent getting spammed the email must be send from the email address
https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification#email
and you should not send more than one email per day per sender. (plus
points for DKIM signed emails)
**Please do NOT submit data that is related to other types of abuse emails**
timestamp,destination IP address,destination port,feed-name
timestamp: YYYY-MM (please do not include more fine grained time information)
destination IP address: IPv4 or IPv6 address (mandatory)
destination port (if available)
feed-name (if available) example value: shadowserver-drone
sinkhole-malware-alerts riseup net
[1]
https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Services/Botnet-Drone-Hadoop
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