[tor-talk] if browser remembers URLs visited before shutdown even during Never Remember History

[Nick Levinson]

This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage, unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .

One need not use Tails to use Tor (I used to sometimes use Tor and never used Tails), so, while Tails may be a good idea, the question remains for Tor and its security architecture when not using Tails.

[bo0od]

Not really Tor is the best practice using it with amnesic system like
Tails due to the guards entry issue ..

There is a full comparison of Tails and Whonix (persistent virtual OS)
can be found here:

Clearnet Link:-

https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others#Introduction

Onion Link:-

http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion/wiki/Comparison_with_Others#Introduction

Post by Nick Levinson

This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage, unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .

One need not use Tails to use Tor (I used to sometimes use Tor and never used Tails), so, while Tails may be a good idea, the question remains for Tor and its security architecture when not using Tails.

[intrigeri]

Post by bo0od
There is a full comparison of Tails and Whonix (persistent virtual OS)
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others#Introduction

FTR the Tails part of that page is quite outdated.

[bo0od]

add the updated tests , the wiki even accept anonymous edits.

you can discuss that openly in the forum of Whonix as well.

(though, i dont see much changes that would make Tor safer only through
the amnesic usage)

Post by intrigeri

Post by bo0od
There is a full comparison of Tails and Whonix (persistent virtual OS)
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others#Introduction

FTR the Tails part of that page is quite outdated.

[Mirimir]

Post by Nick Levinson

This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage, unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .

One need not use Tails to use Tor (I used to sometimes use Tor and never used Tails), so, while Tails may be a good idea, the question remains for Tor and its security architecture when not using Tails.

Sure, but this isn't a _Tor_ issue. It's just about Tor browser, which
is just (heavily) modified Firefox. And although I'm no software expert,
I'm guessing that it's impossible to guarantee what some code will or
won't leave behind when it crashes. Even if you tweaked the browser to
never write temp files to disk, and keep everything in RAM, you couldn't
guarantee that the OS won't write stuff to disk.

That is, unless there _is_ no disk, as in Tails. Even with Whonix,
traces likely remain in the virtual disk. And sure, you can run Whonix
with virtual disks, which don't persist changes. But even then, who's to
say what might get left on the host. I'm less familiar with other
sandboxing options, but I suspect that there are similar issues.

[Nick Levinson]

I think of how people actually use a product, which is usually not with all recommendations applied. There's good reason for using Tor even with an ordinary OS and Tor Project supports use with Windows and MacOS as well as Linux and Android, with Linux not limited to Tails (https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en) or Whonix. I use Linux. I want an OS that runs on my hard drive so I can set/modify it more easily and I'm not sure abouot using an OS within an OS for a rare purpose. Probably many users add Tor to their existing OS for some of the benefits of Tor.

[T]his . . . [i]s . . . about Tor browser, which is just (heavily) modified Firefox.

Exactly why the focus here.

I'm guessing that it's impossible to guarantee what some code will or won't leave behind when it crashes.

I guess we can call it a crash but it looks like a normal shutdown. Shutdown normally limits time available to an app for self-clean-up. So, data persists.
It'll be good enough to correct the UI so it reflects what the program does. So, if Tor on most OSes keeps data, the UI should not say Never Remember History. Maybe it should say Never Remember New History. That's what Firefox needs and apparently Tor has the same relevant architecture so probably that's what Tor needs, too.