[tor-talk] Media Write Protection / Crypto Devices / BadUSB - #OpenFabs #OpenHW

[grarpamp]

This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage,
unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .

Sure, but this isn't a _Tor_ issue. It's just about Tor browser, which
is just (heavily) modified Firefox. And although I'm no software expert,
I'm guessing that it's impossible to guarantee what some code will or
won't leave behind when it crashes. Even if you tweaked the browser to
never write temp files to disk, and keep everything in RAM, you couldn't
guarantee that the OS won't write stuff to disk.
That is, unless there _is_ no disk, as in Tails. Even with Whonix,
traces likely remain in the virtual disk.

There is never "no" disk, just a matter of which ones
are plugged into the box, physically, or remotely.

Only old SCSI, optical, some floppy / tape mediums
had functional hardware write protect. Even burnables
could conceivably have more bits burnt, or burnt down,
later.

USB and SD are software honor system write protect.

Most people don't even know they can disable swap
and keep system mounted read-only, that's basic.

Uid 0 can write to all firmware and user areas on all
media.

Some flash chips and controllers can be soldered / cut
per docs to enable write protect lines.

No media lasts forever, is bug free, or bitrot proof.

Kanguru does make a hardware write protect USB series.
Transcend Jetflash, PQI, and others might.
Some claim to offer additional protections such
as signed firmware loads, etc.

Any firmwares involved may or may not be protected
against BadUSB... ask them how their write protect
etc works... if you're brave / dumb enough to believe their
non #OpenFabs , non #OpenHW marketing lies about it.

Same goes for any claims about integrated AES
encryption hardware, PKI sticks, crypto key modules,
hardware enclaves, and all other backdoored junk you
can't see, etc.
Including from the likes of Intel, Apple, Trezor...

Even from opensource OS that refuse to implement block storage
opcode command filtering to help prevent at least some
user level propagation common with shared / public systems.

https://www.kanguru.com/

https://adamcaudill.com/2014/10/02/making-badusb-work-for-you-derbycon/


"
Blaze speculates that the USB attack may in fact already be common
practice for the NSA. He points to a spying device known as
Cottonmouth, revealed earlier this year in the leaks of Edward
Snowden. The device, which hid in a USB peripheral plug, was
advertised in a collection of NSA internal documents as
surreptitiously installing malware on a target’s machine. The exact
mechanism for that USB attack wasn’t described. “I wouldn’t be
surprised if some of the things [Nohl and Lell] discovered are what we
heard about in the NSA catalogue.”

The alternative is to treat USB devices like hypodermic needles.

Nohl says he and Lell reached out to a Taiwanese USB device maker,
whom he declines to name, and warned the company about their BadUSB
research. Over a series of emails, the company [Phison] *repeatedly
denied* that the attack was possible.
"

Remember, BadUSB porn got Bin Laden :) ... maybe.

Rubber up your duckies, check hashes, backup, be insane!



#OpenFabs , #OpenHW , #OpenSW , #OpenDev , #OpenBiz

When will you ever learn... it's not that hard.



Cc the biased and censored metzdowd list because...

;)

[Mirimir]

Post by grarpamp

This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage,
unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .

Sure, but this isn't a _Tor_ issue. It's just about Tor browser, which
is just (heavily) modified Firefox. And although I'm no software expert,
I'm guessing that it's impossible to guarantee what some code will or
won't leave behind when it crashes. Even if you tweaked the browser to
never write temp files to disk, and keep everything in RAM, you couldn't
guarantee that the OS won't write stuff to disk.
That is, unless there _is_ no disk, as in Tails. Even with Whonix,
traces likely remain in the virtual disk.

There is never "no" disk, just a matter of which ones
are plugged into the box, physically, or remotely.

OK, I should have said "unless there _is_ no disk, as there _can be_ in
Tails". I've run Tails (and my own LiveCDs) on diskless machines. And
yes, using USB for live systems is iffy. But write-once CDs are pretty
safe, I think. No?

<SNIP>